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Abstract: This paper examines the micro-foundations of the relationship
between political particularism, support for democracy and support for Shari’a
in the Arab World. Our hypotheses suggest that particularism reduces support
for democracy whilst it increases support for Shari’a since, at the individual-
level, in-group (family/clan) obligations are more binding than obligations
towards the state (universal). We test our hypotheses using data from the Arab
Barometer. Results suggest that, even when allowing for the correlation of the
error terms, particularism significantly increases support for Shari’a whilst it
decreases support for democracy. Our results are robust to alternative specifica-
tions of the model and to the use of techniques aimed at addressing the
potential endogeneity of particularism.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the effects of political particularism on support for democracy
and support for Shari’a in the Arab World. The so-called “Arab Spring” has been
regarded as a potential new wave of democratization, the rise of the peoples
within several Arab countries against oppressive elites breathed the promise of a
democratic Middle East. Although multifaceted, with causes and implications
specific to each country, these protests were in large part moved by feelings
of frustration over poor economic performance and by the refusal of the existing
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political systems that were perceived as corrupted and non-democratic
(de Miguel, Jamal, and Tessler 2015). The question that only the future will
answer is whether or not these countries will be able to make the transition
towards consolidated democracy. One of the important aspects of getting
through such a transition is how the new democratic political system is regarded
legitimate by its citizens and how these citizens feel that their values actually
“fit” with democracy (Lipset 1960). To put it differently, popular support is
considered a crucial issue of regime stability, especially in emerging democra-
cies (Diamond 1999).
Several scholars so far have investigated the determinants of individual-
level support for democracy. Recently, part of this literature has underlined the
central role played not only by structural factors, such as institutional reform
and economic development, but also by political culture (Tessler 2002b). One
of the key aspects affecting democratic support and stability is the structure of
the electoral system (Svolik 2013; Panizza 2001). Accordingly, the way that
individuals, experience, assess and undergo the electoral process is likely to
have an impact on support for democracy (Robbins and Tessler 2012). The
literature about the determinants of individual support for democracy in the
Arab world can be classified into three groups. The first group of studies refers
to modernization theory and to its cultural implications (Inglehart and Norris
2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) according to which education, income and
egalitarian gender views are significant determinants of attitudes toward
democracy (Jamal 2006). The second group of studies refers to social capital
theory according to which social trust, by providing a basis for cooperation
among the members of a society, is a fundamental ingredient of democracy
(Jamal 2007a, 2007b; Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti
1994). The third group of studies focuses on religiosity and on cultural traits
and, as far as the Muslim world is concerned, finds no incompatibility between
Islamic values and support for democracy (Ciftci 2012).
In this paper, we argue that there is another determinant of individual
support for democracy in the Arab world, namely political particularism.
Following Carey and Shugart (1995) and Shugart (1999), political particularism
is defined as the ability of policymakers to further their careers by catering to
narrow interests rather than to broader national platforms. Political particular-
ism implies the existence of a loyalty between voters and political elites. This
loyalty passes through family, clan and friendship obligations (Veenendaal
2014) and, as argued by Weber (1970) and many others, contrasts with modern
democratic societies where abstract rules of good conduct apply to several social
situations, and not just towards a small circle of personal friends and relatives
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(Tabellini 2010).1 The manner in which politicians further their careers and the
choices of voters with respect to candidates, are likely to influence how democ-
racy is perceived, supported and manifested as well as the quality of the
governments (Hicken and Simmons 2008). As suggested by Seddon et al.
(2001), politicians who are supposed to please narrow geographical constituen-
cies, are likely to advocate narrower, more particularistic policies than those
who further their career by following party dictates (Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and
Rostagno 2002). At the same time, voters, who must channel their demands
through politics, are likely to prefer candidates who are supposed to accord
some benefit to the group they feel to be part of. The way how they perceive the
breadth of this group determines their preferences in voting. More universalistic
voters would prefer candidates who foster the interests of the entire community
whilst more particularistic ones would prefer candidates who foster the interests
of a narrower circle of related people (i. e. family, clan, and friends).
Traditionally, democracy has been seen as the institution aimed at safeguarding
the conflicting interests of the entire community of citizens or, at least, of the
majority of them. Thus, particularistic voters are less likely to support democ-
racy and democratic values with respect to more universalistic ones.
Recently in the Arab world there has been an extraordinary outbreak of
Islamic movements calling for the construction of an increasingly global,
Muslim identity, based on common beliefs, rituals, social practices and for a
return to the Shari’a.2 These movements, apparently universalist, are indeed
rooted in the local contexts so that the universalistic Islamic identity often
coexists and is pushed by a more particularistic one (Lapidus 2001). As sug-
gested by Ciftci (2012), in the Muslim world Shari’a and democracy are two sides
of the same coin and the analysis of individual attitudes toward democracy will
be incomplete without considering support for Shari’a. In fact, the historical
legacy and the so-called secular-Islamist cleavage have penetrated almost all
political issues and actions in the Muslim world (Hunter 1996) by shaping also
individual attitudes (Ciftci 2012). This does not mean that in the Arab world
Islam is incompatible with democracy. Rather, this means that, as in Tessler
(2011), individual opinion in the Arab world is divided about secular and Islamic
governing principles and most Arab citizens voice support for both democracy
and Shari’a that are, therefore, inextricably linked.
1 This relates to the distinction between “generalized” versus “limited” morality introduced by
Platteau (2000) and stressed by Tabellini (2010).
2 The basic Islamic legal system derived from the religious precepts of Islam, particularly the
Quran, the central religious text and the Hadith, the collections of the reports by the prophet.
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Given the above considerations, our hypotheses are that (1) political parti-
cularism negatively affects support for democracy in the Arab World whilst
(2) it positively affects support for Shari’a. To empirically test these hypotheses,
we fully exploit the richness of the Arab Barometer. Firstly, we show that
political particularism, once controlling for modernization theory indicators
(education, income, egalitarian gender views) and for indicators of social capital
(social and institutional trust), reduces support for democracy. We then show
that this result is robust to the use of alternative specifications of the model and
of econometric techniques aimed at addressing the potential endogeneity of
particularism. Secondly, we investigate the relationship between individual
attitudes toward support for democracy and towards support for Shari’a.
Overall, our findings indicate that (1) particularism reduces support for
democracy. This relationship is, indeed, causal. Moreover, even when allowing
for the correlation of the error terms, (2) particularism significantly increases
support for Shari’a.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data
and methods, Section 3 presents the results while Section 4 concludes and
suggests avenues for following research.
2 Data and Methods
2.1 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on the secondwave of the Arab Barometer, a project
developed in consultation with a network composed of regional barometers in Latin
America, Sub-Saharan Africa, East and South Asia.3 Our sample is composed of
10 countries4 and covers 12,782 individuals for the period 2010–2011. The question-
naire in the Arab Barometer included, among others, questions on citizens’ attitudes
about public affairs and governance, religion and religiosity, social capital, family
status, employment and satisfaction with the government. One key question on
political particularism was also included in the questionnaire: “In general, to what
extent is it important to you that the candidate is from your family/tribe in deciding
who to vote for in elections?”. For ease of interpretation, we recoded the responses as
“not important= 1”, “A limited extent = 2”, “A medium extent = 3” and “A great
extent = 4”.
3 http://www.globalbarometer.net
4 Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen.
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Our main variable for support for democracy is measured considering the
answers to the questions:
1. Under a democratic system, the country’s economic performance is weak.
2. Democratic regimes are indecisive and full of problems.
3. Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability.
4. Democracy negatively affects social and ethical values in your country.
For each item, “strongly agree” was recoded as 1, “agree” was recoded as 2,
“disagree” was recoded as 3 and “strongly disagree” was recoded as 4. These
four variables were then summed and transformed into an index ranging from
4 to 16 and measuring support for democracy. To assess the robustness of our
results a principal component analysis was also conducted and the first factor was
extracted. Moreover, a third measure of overall support for democracy was con-
structed by using the answer to the question: “I will describe different political
systems to you, and I want to ask you about your opinion of each one of them with
regard to the country’s governance – for each one would you say it is very good,
good, bad, or very bad?”. More specifically, respondents were asked to express their
opinion regarding “A democratic political system”. For ease of interpretation the
answers to this question were recoded with “very bad”= 1 and “very good”= 4.
Support for Shari’a is measured with an item asking the respondents to
evaluate whether a system governed by Islamic law without elections or political
parties would be suitable to rule respondents’ countries. The answers are given
from a scale from 1 to 4 and were recoded such as “Absolutely inappropriate = 1”
and “Very appropriate = 4”. As such, this variable differentiates weak from
ardent supporters of Shari’a (Ciftci 2012).
Among the independent variables, we included gender and age together
with a set of indicators of modernization theory. In particular, self-reported
measures of education (Level of education), employment status (Employment
status) and income (Log income USD dollars) have been used to assess whether
increased wealth generate positive attitudes towards democracy. Four measures
of trust were used to test the hypotheses related to social capital theory.
According to this argument, general trust provides the basis for cooperation
among the members of society, it enhances associational activity and reciprocity
and, therefore, it is an essential element of regime stability and support of
democracy. At the institutional level, institutional trust conveys legitimacy to
democratic institutions. Recently Jamal (2007b) has challenged this argument by
showing that in authoritarian settings, such as the Middle East, a higher level of
social trust is indeed associated with support for the existing regime, and hence
negatively related with democracy.
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Thus, in our empirical specification we added among the controls a standard
dichotomous measure of generalized trust5 (General trust) together with three
measures of institutional trust (Trust Government, Trust Public Security, Trust
Army) evaluating confidence in the government, public security and in the army
(Jamal 2007a, 2007b). The estimated specifications also include a variable account-
ing for the time spent in Western countries6 (Time spent in Western countries), the
individual degree of interest in politics (How interested in politics), two measures of
institutional satisfaction (Satisfaction with the government7 and Satisfaction with
democracy and human rights8) and a measure of Internet use (Internet Use). An item
about self-assessed religiosity was also used9 (Self-assessed religiosity). Summary
statistics of all the variables used in our specifications are provided in Table 1.
The surveyed individuals indicated widespread support for both, democracy
and Shari’a in every country in our sample. On average, Egypt shows the highest
average score on support for democracy while Jordan the lowest one. As far as
support for Shari’a is concerned, Saudi Arabia shows the highest average score
while Lebanon shows the lowest one. Accordingly, particularism is at its highest
average level in Jordan while it is at its lowest average level in Lebanon.
No significant average differences emerge across gender and age.10
2.2 Methods
We first estimate a series of OLS regressions including cross-sectional estimation
with a progressive larger set of controls and with country fixed effects. As a
robustness check, in order to take into account the ordinal nature of the
dependent variable, in Table 3 we report ordered logit estimation. Test statistics
are based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. We consider also
estimates obtained by interacting political particularism with some indicators
of modernization theory and institutional satisfaction.
One of the key issues of estimating the relationship between political
particularism and support for democracy using survey data is endogeneity of
5 “Generally speaking, do you think most people are trustworthy or not?”
6 “During the past five years, did you spend time in a Western country?”
7 “Suppose that there was a scale from 1–10 to measure the extent of your satisfaction with the
government, inwhich 1means that youwere absolutelyunsatisfiedwith itsperformanceand10means
that you were very satisfied, to what extent are you satisfied with the government’s performance?”
8 “If you were to evaluate the state of democracy and human rights in your country today,
would you say that they are very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?”
9 “Generally speaking, would you describe yourself as...? Religious, Somewhat religious, Not
religious”
10 Summary statistics by gender and age are available upon request.
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political particularism that prevents the causal interpretation of the results. In
fact, our main estimated parameter of interest might be reflecting reverse
causation as people who support less democracy are, indeed, more particular-
ists. Moreover, unobserved heterogeneity might result in omitted variable bias
since there could be some unobserved factors that determine both political
particularism and support for democracy. In order to address these issues, we
apply Instrumental Variables (henceforth, IV) techniques. Our identification
strategy is based therefore on the estimation of a two equations’ system, the
first one describing support for democracy while the second one is the first
step in the IV strategy and includes our instrument for political particularism.
For an instrument to be reliable it must meet at least two criteria. First, it must
be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable, in our case political
particularism, conditional on the other covariates (the so-called relevance
condition). Second, it must be uncorrelated with the error term in the
Table 1: Summary statistics.
Mean Std.dev. Min Max
Support for democracy . .  
Support for Shari’a . .  
Democratic political system, how good . .  
Support for democracy, pca . . – 
Political Particularism . .  
Gender . .  
Age . .  
Level of education . .  
Employment status . .  
Log income USD dollars . . – 
General trust . .  
Trust Government . .  
Trust Public Security . .  
Trust Army . .  
How interested in politics . .  
Internet use . .  
Time spent in western countries . .  
Satisfaction with the government . .  
Satisfaction with democracy and human rights in country . .  
Self-assessed religiosity . .  
Instrument
Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization . . . .
Observations ,
Source: Author’s elaboration from the Arab barometer.
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explanatory equation, conditional on the other covariates (the so-called ortho-
gonality condition); that is, the instrument cannot suffer from the same pro-
blem as the original predicting variable. Since it is not possible to directly test
this condition, we should rely on common sense and economic theory to
decide which instruments are more suitable for our variable of interest.
In our empirical strategy we use a measure of ethnolinguistic fractionaliza-
tion at the country level, as the one used in Alesina et al. (2003), as an instru-
ment for individual-level political particularism. Within economics there has
been a large and growing literature, beginning with Mauro (1995), using indexes
of ethnolinguistic fractionalization either as an instrument or as an explanatory
variable for various economic outcomes. A part of this literature has used cross-
country data to investigate the effects of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on
democracy pointing to inconclusive results.
Empirically, we find that the measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is
not correlated with individual-level support for democracy. We believe
that the level of ethnolinguistic fractionalization cannot per se exert a direct
influence on individual-level support for democracy. Rather, it creates the premise
for the individual choice. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the impact
of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on support for democracy occurs through the
individual-level political particularism. To put it otherwise, following Jensen and
Skaaning (2012), we claim that ethnolinguistic fractionalization is a conditional
factor only indirectly explaining support for democracy by moderating the effect
of modernization and by increasing particularistic attitudes.
After assessing the causal effect of political particularism on support for
democracy, we investigate the relationship between individual attitudes
toward democracy and individual attitudes towards Shari’a. Empirically, we
control for the dependency between the individual-level determinants of both,
support for Shari’a and support for democracy. Since we assume the error
terms of both equations to be correlated, we run both equations simulta-
neously by means of a seemingly unrelated model (henceforth, SUR) and we
estimate the full variance–covariance matrix of the coefficients.
3 Results
Table 2 presents the results of the OLS estimations. Political particularism has a
negative and significant effect on support for democracy.11 This result stays
11 Regressions by country are reported in Table 6. The results show that the coefficient for
particularism is negatively and significantly correlated with support for democracy in Egypt, Iraq,
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Table 2: Support for democracy, OLS estimation.
() () ()
Political Particularism –.*** –.*** –.***
(.) (.) (.)
Gender . . .
(.) (.) (.)
Age .** .** .
(.) (.) (.)
Level of education .*** .*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
Employed . . .
(.) (.) (.)
Log income USD dollars .*** .*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
General trust –. –.**
(.) (.)
Trust Government –. .
(.) (.)
Trust Public Security . –.
(.) (.)
Trust Army .*** .***
(.) (.)
How interested in politics –.*
(.)
Internet use .*
(.)
Time spent in western countries .
(.)
Satisfaction with the government –.
(.)
Satisfaction with democracy
and human rights in country
.
(.)
Self-assessed religiosity –.
(.)
Constant .*** .*** .***
(.) (.) (.)
Observations , , ,
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. OLS estimation.
Dep.var. Support for democracy.
Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan and Tunisia. The coefficient is not significantly correlated with
support for democracy in Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The controls suggest that there is
heterogeneity across countries with respect to the sign and statistical significance of the covariates.
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virtually unchanged across all specifications of the model and is robust to the
use of alternative definitions as described in Section 2 and reported in Table 4
and to the estimation by Ordered Logit as reported in Table 3.12
Table 3: Robustness check, Ordered Logit Estimation.
Support for
democracy
Political Particularism –.***
(.)
Gender .
(.)
Age .
(.)
Level of education .**
(.)
Employed .
(.)
Log income USD dollars .***
(.)
General trust –.**
(.)
Trust Government .
(.)
Trust Public Security –.
(.)
Trust Army .***
(.)
How interested in politics –.**
(.)
Internet Use .*
(.)
Time spent in western countries .
(.)
Satisfaction with the government –.
(.)
Satisfaction with democracy and human rights in
country
.
(.)
Self-assessed religiosity –.
(.)
(continued )
12 The result is robust also when rebalancing the sample to account for population size. Results
are available upon request.
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Table 3: (continued )
Support for
democracy
cut
Constant –.***
(.)
cut
Constant –.***
(.)
cut
Constant –.***
(.)
cut
Constant –.***
(.)
cut
Constant –.***
(.)
cut
Constant –.***
(.)
cut
Constant –.
(.)
cut
Constant .
(.)
cut
Constant .***
(.)
cut
Constant .***
(.)
cut
Constant .***
(.)
cut
Constant .***
(.)
Observations ,
Country dummies Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05,
*** p < 0.01. Ordered logit estimation. Dep.var. Support for democracy.
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Table 4: Robustness check, alternative indicators.
() ()
Democratic political
system, how good
Support for
democracy, pca
Political Particularism –.*** –.***
(.) (.)
Gender . .
(.) (.)
Age .*** .
(.) (.)
Level of education .*** .***
(.) (.)
Employed . .
(.) (.)
Log income USD dollars .* .***
(.) (.)
General trust . –.**
(.) (.)
Trust Government . .
(.) (.)
Trust Public Security . –.
(.) (.)
Trust Army –.* .***
(.) (.)
How interested in politics –.*** –.*
(.) (.)
Internet Use –. .*
(.) (.)
Time spent in western countries –. .
(.) (.)
Satisfaction with the government –. –.
(.) (.)
Satisfaction with democracy and
human rights in country
–. .
(.) (.)
Self-assessed religiosity .*** –.
(.) (.)
–.*** –.***
Constant –.
(.)
cut
Constant –.***
(.)
cut
(continued )
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The size of the effect is small in absolute terms, ranging between 0.30 and 0.33
points, similarly to related studies based on micro data (e. g., Rotondi and
Stanca 2015). Indeed, in relative terms the size of the effect of particularism is
sizeable, being larger than that of education, employment status, income and
all other individual-level characteristics. Particularism is therefore by far the
strongest factor explaining individual-level support for democracy. The inclu-
sion of measures of interest in politics provides a test of the role of political
attention in mediating particularism’s impact on democratic attitudes (Evans
and Rose 2012). Column 3 of Table 2 shows that the introduction of this
variable (which is negative and significantly related with support for democ-
racy), does not attenuate the size of the coefficient for particularism which is,
indeed, increased.
Among the indicators of modernization theory, education and income have
positive and significant effects on support for democracy with the latter effect
being greater than the former, confirming some previous findings (Lipset 1959;
Evans and Rose 2012). Among the indicators of social capital theory, general
trust is statistically significant with a negative coefficient, a result that corrobo-
rates the findings in Jamal (2007b). Trust in army and Internet use turn out to be
positively and significantly related to support for democracy. Religiosity does
not exhibit statistical significance in either model, which is congruent with the
findings of previous studies (Tessler 2002a and 2002b).
The second and third lines of Table 5 report the results of estimating the same
equation as in column 3 of Table 2 while adding interaction terms between
political particularism and two indicators of modernization theory, namely
Table 4: (continued )
() ()
Democratic political
system, how good
Support for
democracy, pca
Constant –.***
(.)
cut
Constant .
(.)
Observations , ,
Country dummies Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
(1) Ordered logit estimation. (2) OLS estimation.
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education and income. While the first interaction term does not reach statistical
significance, the interaction term between political particularism and income
suggests that the negative effect of political particularism on individual-level
support for democracy is greater as income increases. The fourth and fifth lines
of Table 5 report the results of estimating the same equation as in column 3 of
Table 2 while adding interaction terms between political particularism and two
indicators of institutional satisfaction, namely satisfaction with the actual govern-
ment ruling the country (fourth line) and with the state of democracy and human
rights in the country (fifth line). It turns out that the effect of political particular-
ism on support for democracy is greater when support for actual government
increases and is smaller as satisfaction with the state of democracy increases.
The main message of the regressions in Tables 2–6 is that there seems to be
a strong correlation between political particularism and individual-level support
for democracy and that this relationship is moderated by individual-level
income and satisfaction with the government and with the state of democracy
in the country of origin.
3.1 Addressing Causality
Table 7 reports IV estimation results. The first column reports the estimation of
the first stage equation. The power of the instrument exceeds the conventional
Table 5: Support for democracy, interactions with particularism.
() () () ()
Political Particularism –.*** –.*** –.*** –.***
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Particularism*Education .
(.)
Particularism*Income .***
(.)
Particularism*Government Satisfaction .***
(.)
Particularism*Satisfaction with democracy –.***
(.)
Observations , , , ,
Standard Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p < 0.01. OLS estimation. Dep.
Var. Support for democracy.
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Table 7: Instrumental variables regression.
() ()
First Stage Political
Particularism
IV Support for
democracy
Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization .***
(.)
Political Particularism –.**
(.)
Gender . .
(.) (.)
Age –.** –.
(.) (.)
Level of education –. .
(.) (.)
Employed –.* .
(.) (.)
Log income USD dollars .*** .***
(.) (.)
General trust . –.
(.) (.)
Trust Government –.** –.
(.) (.)
Trust Public Security –. .
(.) (.)
Trust Army .*** .
(.) (.)
How interested in politics .*** –.
(.) (.)
Internet Use –. .***
(.) (.)
Time spent in western countries .* .
(.) (.)
Satisfaction with the government .*** –.
(.) (.)
Satisfaction with democracy and human rights in
country
.*** .**
(.) (.)
Self-assessed religiosity –. –.**
(.) (.)
Constant .*** .***
(.) (.)
Observations , ,
Country dummies Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.
(1) First stage. OLS estimation. Dep.var. Political Particularism. (2) IV. OLS estimation. Dep.var.
Support for democracy. * p < 0.10, **p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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minimum standard of power of F= 10 (Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002).13
The results of the IV estimation are statistically significant and in line with our
theoretical prediction: political particularism decreases support for democracy.
Indeed, the size of the estimated effect is even larger when using IV, suggesting
that failing to account for the endogeneity of particularism may lead to under-
estimating its effect on support for democracy.
3.2 Support for Democracy and Support for Shari’a
Table 8 reports the results of the SUR model. The findings indicate that, for the
individual, the correlation of the residuals in the two equations is –0.1828 and
that the hypothesis that this correlation is zero is rejected.14 Therefore, given the
Table 8: SUR model.
() ()
Support for
Shari’a
Support for
democracy
Political Particularism .*** –.***
(.) (.)
Gender –. .
(.) (.)
Age –.*** .
(.) (.)
Level of education –.*** .***
(.) (.)
Employed –. .
(.) (.)
Log income USD dollars –. .**
(.) (.)
General trust –. –.**
(.) (.)
Trust Government –.* .
(.) (.)
Trust Public Security .*** .
(.) (.)
(continued )
13 F(1,6097) = 11.83, Prob > F=0.0006.
14 Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(1) = 195.075, Pr = 0.0000.
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peculiar structure of the Muslim world, it is not advisable to study support for
democracy without considering support for Shari’a (Ciftci 2012).
Political particularism significantly reduces support for democracy whilst
it increases support for Shari’a. This opposite effect (in the same direction) is
found for education. The higher the level of education, the lower is the support
of Shari’a and the higher is the support for democracy. Other covariates
indicate that trust in government is negatively correlated with both support
for Shari’a and support for democracy although in the latter case it is not
significant. Surprisingly, the time spent in western countries is positively and
significantly correlated with support for Shari’a while it turns out to be nega-
tively although not significantly related to support for democracy. The same
pattern is found for interest in politics. On the opposite, while religiosity does
not reach statistical significance for support for democracy, it is positively
related to support for Shari’a.
Table 8: (continued )
() ()
Support for
Shari’a
Support for
democracy
Trust Army –. .***
(.) (.)
How interested in politics .*** –.*
(.) (.)
Internet Use –.* .*
(.) (.)
Time spent in western countries .** .
(.) (.)
Satisfaction with the government . –.
(.) (.)
Satisfaction with democracy and human rights in
country
.*** .
(.) (.)
Self-assessed religiosity .*** –.
(.) (.)
Constant .*** .***
(.) (.)
Observations , ,
Country dummies Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis; * p < 0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
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4 Conclusion
In this article we have further explored the underlying dynamics of individual-
level support for democracy and support for Shari’a in the Arab world. In
particular, we have investigated how political particularism affects these atti-
tudes at the individual level. Our results show that particularism decreases
support for democracy. Indeed, in relative terms, the size of the effect of
particularism is substantial, being larger than that of education, employment
status, income (as posited by modernization theory) and social trust (as posited
by social capital theory), hence all other individual-level characteristics.
Particularism is therefore by far the strongest factor explaining individual-level
support for democracy in the Arab world and its effect on support for democracy
is, indeed, causal. Thus, reducing political particularism can be identified as an
effective way to increase support for democracy.
Our underlying claim is that voters with a more universalistic stance would
prefer candidates who foster the interests of the entire community whilst more
particularistic inclined ones would prefer candidates who foster the interests of
a narrower circle of related people (i. e. family, clan, and friends). This relates to
the distinction between “generalized” versus “limited” morality introduced by
Platteau (2000) and stressed by Tabellini (2010) and with the extensive literature
showing that particularism is often associated with more widespread informal
institutions (Mungiu-Pippidi 2005), lower civic mindedness and higher corrup-
tion (Uslaner 2002).
In this perspective, social relations in particularistic societies rely on strong
ties informed by principles of tradition, conformity and benevolence inside small
circles of related people (i. e., members of the family, friends, and members of
the clan) while outside this small network, selfish behavior is considered
morally acceptable (Tabellini 2010). Particularism, therefore, can be conducive
to several antisocial behaviors and, potentially, can undermine the cohesion of
the social fabric. Thus, studying the effects of particularism is relevant to inform
development practitioners and policy makers. To date, the determinants of
particularism at the individual-level are still unclear and it is not easy to
formulate some clear policy interventions to reduce particularism and favor
universalism (Rotondi and Stanca 2015). Some scholars have indicated educa-
tion as the most promising area of intervention. In fact, as argued by Glaeser,
Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2007), education enhances social trust thus contributing
to overcoming problems of collective action. The relationship between education
and particularism, however, is not completely clear and further researches in
this direction are needed.
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Following Ciftci (2012), in this paper we have also studied how particularism
affects support for Shari’a, another side of support for democracy in the Arab
world. Our summary statistics show that several supporters of democracy also
favor Shari’a in the Arab world. At the same time, the results of the estimation of
a simultaneous equation model show that when allowing for the correlation of
the error terms, particularism increases support for Shari’a while it decreases
support for democracy.
These findings offer new insights into challenges of building widespread
support for democracy in the Arab world, particularly after the Arab spring. Our
conclusions, however, should be weighedagainst some weaknesses of public
opinion data. Greater caution is needed about the available measures of support
for democracy. In fact, the existing data do not tell us anything about what
respondents really mean by democracy, or, ultimately, how they perceive it. To
date, data on support for democracy are diffused and several major empirical
research programs are monitoring public support for democratic institutions,
including, among others, the LatinoBarometer, the AfroBarometer, the European
Values Survey, and the World Values Survey. The questions contained in these
datasets are regularly used by scholars in different fields and demonstrate
internal consistency. However, as Inglehart (2003), suggests while from a theo-
retical point of view the relationship between support for democracy and demo-
cratic institutions seems to be clear, there is still some doubts regarding
whether, at the empirical level,high level of mass support for these issues is
actually conducive to democratic institutions. These and other issues should be
further investigatedin future research work in the Arab world.
Funding: National Research University Higher School of Economics. The article
was prepared within the framework of a subsidy granted to the HSE by the
Government of the Russian Federation for the implementation of the Global
Competitiveness Program.
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